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Abstract
With the advent of the Kyoto Protocol and its recognition of the use of forestry
activities and carbon sinks as acceptable tools for addressing the issue of the build-up of
atmospheric carbon, the potential role of planted forests as a vehicle for carbon sequestration
has taken on a new significance.  Additionally, the emergence of tradable emission permits
and now tradable carbon offsets provides a vehicle for financially capturing the benefits of
carbon emission reductions and carbon offsetting activities.  In a world where carbon
sequestration has monetary value, investments in planted forests can be made with an eye to
revenues to (at least two) joint outputs: timber and the carbon sequestration services.
The first section of this paper examines the Patagonia region of Argentina, as an
example of an area where carbon sequestration values combined with timber values create
financial incentives for creating planted forests, which could not be justified on the bases of
timber values alone.  The paper uses a present value approach to evaluate the costs and
benefits of plantation forestry in a "representative" site in Patagonia.  A basic timber harvest
scenario is developed and then a number of alternative scenarios are examined.  These
introduce carbon as an additional product to be produced "jointly" with timber.  The scenarios
include alternative rotation periods, alternative prices for carbon offsets, and a brief
examination of the effect of undertaking a specific silvicultural activity.
In the second section of the paper the results of this analysis are considered in the
context of a discussion of the various types of institutional arrangements that might be
required to provide a market for the carbon sequestration services provided by the planted
forests.  The paper identifies, examines and discusses a number of potential institutional
arrangements that exist or are under discussion for marketing carbon sequestration services.
A number of problems that may arise with offset credits and some of the innovative
institutions that may be created are identified and discussed.
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Protocol, Argentina, developing countries
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POTENTIAL FOR CARBON FOREST PLANTATIONS IN MARGINAL
TIMBER FORESTS: THE CASE OF PATAGONIA, ARGENTINA
Roger A. Sedjo*
SECTION I.   PATAGONIAN FOREST MODELS
Introduction
Forests have long been recognized as generating a suite of desirable outputs.  In
addition to timber, outputs include water quality, flood control, wildlife habitat, outdoor
recreation, and so forth.  In many cases, however, these outputs are not traded in markets and
thus do not contribute financial returns.  Often these outputs have been referred to as external
effects or "externalities."  Thus, for a planted forest, the timber market values typically must
cover the costs of forest establishment, management and protection.  In many regions of the
world, however, the economics of timber production do not justify planted forests, as the
value of the timber harvests do not adequately cover the costs.
Recently, carbon sequestration has come to be recognized as an important output of
forests.  As with many other nontimber outputs, the carbon sequestration values of the forest
have generally not been capturable by forest owners or in markets.  This situation appears to
be changing.  With the advent of the Kyoto Protocol and its recognition of the use of forestry
activities and carbon sinks as acceptable tools for addressing the issue of the build-up of
atmospheric carbon, the potential role of planted forests as a vehicle for carbon sequestration
has taken on a new significance.  Additionally, the emergence of tradable emission permits
and now tradable carbon offsets provides a vehicle for financially capturing the benefits of
carbon emission reductions and carbon offsetting activities.  In a world where carbon
sequestration has monetary value, investments in planted forests can be made with an eye to
revenues to (at least two) joint outputs: timber and the carbon sequestration services.  It
should be noted that almost all of the studies thus far have focused on the cost of carbon
sequestration as a single output, rather than as a joint output with timber (e.g., see Sedjo et al.
1995, Stavins 1999).
The first section of this paper examines the Patagonia region of Argentina, as an
example of an area where carbon sequestration values combined with timber values create
financial incentives for creating planted forests, which could not be justified on the bases of
timber values alone.  After discussing Argentine experience, the paper uses a present value
approach to evaluate the costs and benefits of plantation forestry in a "representative" site in
Patagonia.  The data are presented in spreadsheet form in the appendix.  The basic unit of
analysis is a planted hectare.  However, the hectare is then examined within the context of a
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multiple-hectare forest system.  For convenience, the concept of a regulated forest is developed,
but the basic results are more general.
A basic timber harvest scenario is developed and then a number of alternative
scenarios are examined.  These introduce carbon as an additional product to be produced
"jointly" with timber.  The scenarios include alternative rotation periods, alternative prices for
carbon offsets, and a brief examination of the effect of undertaking a specific silvicultural
activity.  Additional scenarios can easily be examined if desired.  The results of the forest
model financial analysis are summarized and implications developed.
In the second section of the paper the results of this analysis are considered in the
context of a discussion of the various types of institutional arrangements that might be required
to provide a market for the carbon sequestration services provided by the planted forests.  This
paper recognizes that markets for carbon credits are not well developed.  The second section of
this paper identifies, examines and discusses a number of potential institutional arrangements
that exist or are under discussion for marketing carbon sequestration services.  A number of
problems that may arise with offset credits and some of the innovative institutions that may be
created are identified and discussed.  At this time most of these institutions are in their
fledgling stages, and further refinements are likely to be required if they are to be effective in
facilitating various market and market-like activities and transactions.
The Argentine Experience
Argentina has a substantial history of planting trees, including commercial plantations.
Over the years the Government has had a number of different plantation policies, including
periods during which major subsidies were provided and other periods during which they
were withdrawn.  In recent years Argentina has become a significant producer of industrial
wood from forest plantations, mostly in the Mesopotamian region in northeast Argentina.
This region has the conditions for rapid growth rates and relatively short rotations and planted
forests are probably justified on the bases of the expectation of future prices at timber harvest
(Sedjo and Ley, 1995).
As it became well known that forests and forest ecosystems sequester large volumes of
carbon and preliminary studies indicate that forestry has the potential of capturing large
amounts of carbon at a low cost, the interest of Argentina in carbon plantations is focused
largely on Patagonia.  The interest probably reflects the recognition that Patagonian
plantations, for timber alone, are very marginal at best.
Earlier work has suggested that the economic returns to plantations in Patagonia for
the production of industrial wood are usually not justified by normal economic and financial
criteria.  The problems are of two types.  First, although some areas along the eastern side of
the Andes have adequate soils and rainfall to provide good forest growth, the major markets
in Argentina are at a considerable distance; thus the transport cost to the major domestic
markets is high.  Additionally, major ports are some distance therefore making it difficult to
be an efficient exporter.  Second, although growth rates are significant, the species that do
well in Patagonia's soils and climate, commonly introduced from North America, tend to haveRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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slow initial growth, with the more rapid growth coming many years out.  This results in a
relatively long rotation period, in the neighborhood of 27-35 years.  The result of the long
rotation period is a relatively low rate of financial return.
However, producing both timber and carbon, forest plantation appear to offer potential
to promote the economic development of a lagging region.  The government has been mostly
concerned with the development of small-scale forest plantations, as the subsidies for
establishment are often limited to only 300 ha of planting annually.  However, if a market for
carbon sequestration services were to develop, the financial returns to Patagonia plantations
could improve substantially and, at a sufficiently high carbon payment, the subsidy could be
withdrawn without serious reductions in plantation starts.  As mentioned earlier, the Patagonia
planted forest has longer rotations than many plantations, with more growth in the latter
period.  Although this is a financial disadvantage in timber production, this characteristic
could be positive in that the increased growth could occur in a later period when the carbon
sequestration services may become the more valuable.
The recent Kyoto Protocol has reinforced this interest by indicating that certain types
of carbon sinks, and particularly forestry, may have the potential to capture carbon and that
this sequestered carbon can be counted by Annex 1 countries in meeting their carbon
obligations.  Furthermore, forestry is particularly attractive due to the development of a Joint
Implementation (JI) mechanism, which allows carbon projects be undertaken jointly between
countries with the credits directed to the country needing the credits and revenues directed to
the country in which the project is undertaken.  This type of arrangement will probably also
apply for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) currently under development.
Prior Studies
A series of preliminary studies looking at aspects of the possibility of establishing
planted forests in Patagonia had been undertaken by SAGyP (1993), Crossen et al. (1994),
and Sedjo and Ley (1995).  This paper extends some of that earlier work, particularly that of
Sedjo and Ley for the World Bank.
Prior work by Sedjo and Ley examined the cost potential of plantations of different
types in alternative locations in Argentina, including Patagonia.  These results were consistent
with earlier studies by SGCyP, which found that the rate of return to timber plantations in
Patagonia was well below the 10 percent target level of the Argentine Government, generally
in the range of 4-7 percent.  This return is roughly the same return as alternative uses,
primarily extensive grazing.  This early work supported the contention that without substantial
subsidies, generally in the range of a contribution of about $500 or one-half of the plantation
establishment costs of $1000 per ha, the private sector would not have the financial incentives
to establish forest plantations in Patagonia.
In addition, the Sedjo and Ley study estimated the costs of capturing carbon via
planted forests in Patagonia.  For Argentina, the cost estimates ranged from $1.72 to $21.95
per tonne of carbon permanently sequestered, and between $5.36 and $21.95 per tonne in
Patagonia.  However, that analysis did not consider the value of timber.  The study estimatedRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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the present value of costs required to capture carbon at a future date.  It did not, however,
discount future carbon sequestered (see van Kotten et al. 1997 for a discussion of the issue of
discounting future physical volumes of carbon).  The discounting of future payments for
future carbon sequestration becomes important, however, when developing market institutions
to adequately compensate investors for projects that generate revenues from carbon
sequestered at some far distant time.  Future carbon values are discounted in this paper.
This paper expands the earlier work by developing a prototype financial approach for
examining the economic potential of the region to produce jointly both industrial wood and
carbon sequestration services, in place of the largely pastoral economy that now exists.  As
with the timber outputs, the financial approach explicitly considers the time at which the
carbon is sequestered.  It assumes the grower can be compensated for capturing carbon with a
market price that will exist at that time, thereby generating financial benefits to the grower.
The analysis discounts the financial payments, where appropriate, to provide an estimated
present value of the carbon benefits, which are added to the timber benefits.  The general
findings for an individual hectare are expanded to adapt to the desired size of the operation
and alternative scenarios are examined.  Finally, the implications of these findings are
examined in the context of alternative organizational structures and financing arrangements
that might be considered for Patagonia.
The Representative Situation
The study begins with a "typical" or representative hectare of land that is being
considered for conversion into plantation forest.  The representative hectare of land is now in
grass or grass and scrubs and is used as pasture for cattle or sheep.  It is found in a north-south
strip of land running along the east side of the Andes mountains in Argentina from roughly 36
to 46 degrees south latitude with an elevation of about 1500 meters or perhaps slightly higher.
The areas appropriate for forest plantations have suitable soils for forestry and precipitation
ranging from 400 mm on the eastern edge to 1000 mm and above along the western edge.
This land area is found in the western parts of the Patagonia provinces of Neuquen, Rio Negro
and Chubut.  The area suitable for forestry encompasses about 3 million ha or perhaps more.
The tree species most suitable for this area is probably Ponderosa pine.  The expected
biological rotation is 36 years with a financial rotation of about 27 years.
Ponderosa pine, and indeed most species that would be suitable to this area, is
expected to grow relatively slowly for most of the first two decades before its growth
accelerates in the latter part of the second decade and continues into the third decade.  This
growth pattern is reflected in the data of Urzua (no date), used in the spreadsheet figures of
the appendix, as adjusted to provide for data missing for various intervening years.
Land values in this area are $50-$150 per ha.  As noted, the alternative land use is
largely extensive cattle and sheep grazing.  The forest plantation establishment and
operational costs are estimated at a present value of about $1000 per hectare, including land
cost.  Most of the actual cost occurs in the first year.  Subsequent operation and maintenance
costs are very modest with the possible exception of thinning.Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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The results of the base case and other financial analysis are reported in Table 1, which
is drawn from the various spreadsheets.  As noted, a number of studies have suggested that
the financial rates of return are in the range of 4-7 percent per annum.  Our estimate of the
expected present value of our base case for the discounted present value (DPV) of timber
production alone is $354 for the biological rotation of 36 years, and $581 for the financial
rotation of 27 years, assuming a stumpage price of $15 per m3, which is about the current
price.  Of course, given an initial present value of costs of $1000, the net present values are
-$419 and -$546 respectively.  Thus, neither option provides anything near a positive net
present value with a discount rate of 10 percent for the production of timber under conditions
prevailing today.  Once again the earlier assessments are confirmed.
Table 1.  Plantation Forests:  Present Value Timber Product and Carbon
Biological Rotation Financial Rotation
Rotation Period 36 years 27 years
Price Stumpage/m3 $15 $15
PV Timber Harvest $354 $581
PV Plantation Costs $1000 $1000
Net PV  - $546  - $419
Price Carbon/tonne $10 $10
PV Carbon @ $10 $340 $304
NPV Timber&Carbon ($10)  - $206  - $115
Price Carbon/tonne $20 $20
PV Carbon @ $20/tonne $694 $614
NPV Timber&Carbon ($20) $48 $99
Source:  Developed from various spreadsheets.
The next step involves introducing the carbon sequestration into the analysis as a joint
product with timber.  Using the timber yield function of a ha of planted ponderosa, two
adjustments are made.  The first converts the estimate of industrial wood volume, as provided
in the yield function, to an estimate of total tree biomass.  The timber yield function provides
an estimate of the industrial wood volume per ha, i.e., the industrial wood in the stems of the
trees on a ha of planted ponderosa forest, exclusive of the volume in the branches, tops, stump
and roots.  Provision for the wood volume in these parts of the tree is made with a commonly
used adjustment factor of 1.4 (i.e., biomass units per unit of industrial wood).  Although this
factor will vary somewhat depending on species and other conditions, this value is a usefulRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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average.  Thus, for example, 100 m3 of industrial wood is associated with 140 m3 of total tree
biomass.  The second adjustment is to estimate the tonnes of carbon in the forest biomass.
The factor used is 0.26 tonnes carbon per tonne of biomass.  Again, this value will vary
depending on the density of the tree and so forth, but this again is a commonly used and
useful average.  The data are also modified to provide the annual incremental carbon yield
(rather than the cumulative yield as in a typical yield function).  Finally, additional carbon that
may be associated with the newly created forest "ecosystem" includes grown litter (detritus),
understory vegetation and newly created soil carbon.  These effects are likely to be small or
offsetting, e.g., as with soil carbon that is released upon harvest but increases modestly with
forest vegetation.  In this study these sources of carbon are assumed to be negligible.
The estimates of the annual incremental additions to carbon sequestered per ha of
planted forest are monetized assuming alternative carbon prices in Table 1.  At a price of $10
per tonne for permanently sequestered carbon, the PV of the carbon is estimated at $340 for
the longer biological rotation and the PV of carbon is $304 for the shorter financial rotation.
Assuming a price of $20 per tonne for permanently sequestered carbon, the PV of the carbon
is $694 for the longer rotation and $614 for the shorter financial rotation.
At a carbon price of $20 per permanent tonne and above, the forest plantations provide
benefits (revenues) adequate to financially justify their costs.  The longer biological rotation
generates a PV of total benefits, timber harvest plus carbon benefits of $1048 and the shorter
financial rotation provides a PV of total benefits of $1099.  Both of these PVs of benefits
exceed the $1000 PV of costs.  Thus, net present value is positive at carbon prices about $20
per permanent tonne and higher.
It is seen in Table 1 that as we move from a solely timber operation to a timber and
carbon operation and as the price of carbon rises, the advantage of the shorter financial
rotation diminishes as the increased volumes of carbon in the later periods begin to offset the
advantage of the earlier harvest.  Conceptually, we can think of the optimum financial rotation
as lengthening when the value of carbon rises.  Van Kotten (1995) has shown that if the price
of carbon is sufficiently high, it will never pay financially to harvest and thus the rotation
becomes infinite.
We also examine, very briefly and crudely, the effects of thinning management (the
removal of some portion of the trees throughout the stand).  Thinning is something that is
often recommended by foresters for a number of reasons.  Evidence shows that thinning
results in more volume on fewer trees.  This is valuable if larger logs sell at a premium,
however, it results in some loss in final harvest volume.  Thinning can also improve the cash
flow with the receipt of some revenues before final harvest.  Often, thinning is part of a
strategy of dense planting with the intent to remove weaker trees to improve the vigor of the
remaining stand.  However, thinning in the early part of a rotation often generates net costs.
In our representative case (Table 2A in the Appendix), the financial benefits of
thinning to timber returns are very modest, even when there are no carbon effects.  If we
assume revenues are generated both in the early initial thinning and in the later thinning, the
PV of thinning is only $20, and the negative effects on carbon and carbon revenues have notRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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been assessed.  It is clear, however, that where carbon has a value, thinning will diminish the
carbon in the forest not only in the year of the thinning but in subsequent years also by
lowering biomass and carbon in subsequent periods also.
Overall, it appears the effects of thinning on our analysis are very small and likely to
be negative when significant carbon values are considered.  Additionally, we have no idea of
what, if any, price premium for thinning may be today, to say nothing of what it will be in 36
years.  Thus, for purposes of most of this study, our analysis assumes no thinning occurs.
After Timber Harvests: What Next?
The above analysis carried the process of forest growth through one rotation from the
planting of bare ground to the timber harvest some three decades later.  What happens after
the timber harvest?  There are a number of ways to address this question.  Let us look at two
sources for perspective: the recent Kyoto Protocol and from a more general conceptual view.
First, according to the Kyoto Protocol, carbon credit is to be given for carbon
sequestered through afforestation activities.  However, credit can be lost for Annex 1
countries for deforestation.  Hence, following Kyoto, if the harvested plantation is established
on an area not in forests, as is expected for Patagonia, the activity is clearly eligible for carbon
credits.  However, if the forest is harvested and not regenerated, then this would constitute
deforestation and carbon debits should occur for Annex 1 countries.  However, if the
harvested area is reforested, then the area remains in forest and there appears to be no carbon
debit.  (This is the most common interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol, but it remains
somewhat unclear on this point and clarification may be forthcoming from the international
negotiations.)  Thus, debits would not be forthcoming if replanting takes place after the
harvest.  However, since the replanting of the newly established forest is not on a previously
unplanted area, the second rotation would not be eligible for carbon sequestration credits.
The Steady-State Forest
From a conceptual perceptive, we can think of Patagonia as establishing a "regulated"
or steady-state forest of some desired size, e.g., a million ha, with a rotation of perhaps 30
years (longer than the financial rotation reflecting the carbon effect on the rotation length) and
a planting rate of 33,333 ha per year, enough to plant 1 million ha in thirty years.  Thus, at
year 30 Patagonia will have completed the planting of the one million ha forest.  There will be
30 age cohorts of 33,333 ha, and the first harvest will be undertaken on the 30-year-old
cohort.
From that time on, the forest can be viewed as a regulated forest.  It would be capable
of generating a harvest from one-thirtieth of its area and volume.  If this harvested area were
replanted, the stock of biomass and carbon of the system would remain constant, despite
annual harvests.  Therefore, the forest system would not release any net carbon even though
there were annual harvests.  Also, there would be no carbon debits generated.  However, as
noted with Kyoto, using the steady-state concept, the second rotation would not be eligibleRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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for carbon sequestration credits.  Hence, both the conceptual view and the Kyoto Protocol
give the same results with respect to credits and debits.
Some Problems
One conceptual concern with both the steady-state forest and also with the Kyoto
system, the afforestation provision as commonly interpreted could generate a payment
schedule that would exceed the actual carbon sequestered.  This is because, at any point in
time, a regulated forest consists of all the age groups and some will have a carbon content that
is the average of these ages.  However, the regulated forest, by definition, is only some
portion of its maximum since it always has most of the forest at less than maturity.  But, if
each separate ha receives compensation for the cumulative carbon sequestered in its growing
life, the payment to the regulated forest would be as if it were entirely at its harvest age.
Thus,  with this approach the steady-state system, as the Kyoto system, would provide
compensation based on the maximum carbon per ha at harvest and not what exists in the
regulated forests with its varying ages.  This is payment for more carbon than is stored in the
steady state.
This result occurs in the regulated forest system because one the oldest cohorts begin to
be harvested, the harvest from the oldest cohort equal the total annual forest growth of all the
younger cohorts.  The forest system is in regulated steady state, any first rotation ha that is not
old enough to be harvested will continue to receive carbon credits until harvested.  But, no new
carbon is being sequestered in the regulated system; rather the sequestration of the young ha is
simply offsetting the releases of the harvested ha.  Thus, the regulated system as described and
the Kyoto Protocol both appear to have the potential to provide more compensation than is
justified from the actual amount of carbon sequestered.  However, since this problem does not
occur for the first several decades, it may be that its resolution can be deferred and this issue is
not addressed further in this paper.
Implications
The forest model confirms the results of earlier studies which indicate that, for forest
plantation in Patagonia, the financial returns to timber alone are unlikely to generate anything
close to the revenues needed to generate a positive net present value at a 10 percent discount
rate.  If planted forests jointly produce both timber and carbon, the carbon price needs to be
$20 per permanent tonne or higher to provide a positive net present value.  Also, management
activities such as thinning probably add little value, and can generate negative value if the
carbon values are large.  Finally, the higher the price of carbon, the less important the value of
the timber, and also the less importance given to associated timber quality enhancing activities.
On a larger scale, we can view the annual establishment of plantations as moving
toward the establishment of a large regulated forest.  Hence, at some future date when the
forest system stops expanding, it can be viewed as producing an in-perpetuity flow of timber
and maintaining a permanent stock of carbon and carbon credits.  However, additional carbonRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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credits will not be created in the second rotation.  The results in terms of carbon credits and
debits for afforestation and deforestation are the same as those coming from the forest carbon
guidelines of the Kyoto Protocol.
SECTION II.  POLICY ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS
Background
Without some mechanism to capture the carbon sequestration rights, the sequestration
function of the forests is simply another externality, the returns to which cannot be captured
by the forest owner.  Therefore, investors will not consider the positive benefits of the forest
sequestration function.  However, an institutional mechanism that is under development to
allow the externality to be internalized is the "carbon offset."  Carbon offsets, sometimes
called a certified tradable offset (CTO), would be designed to neutralize or "offset" the carbon
emissions of various activities, usually emissions from fossil fuels use to generate power see
the discussion of UFCMP below), but also possible associated with land use changes.  Carbon
offsets, together with tradable emission permits, would offer power utilities a way to expand
emissions without increasing the total carbon in the atmosphere.  A carbon offset would be
eligible since it represents a given amount of newly sequestered carbon.  An emission permit,
by contrast, does not represent new sequestration.  Rather, for a system with a cap (limit) on
releases, it represents the transfer of releases from one party to another and involves a
redistribution of releases.  For example, in a system with some maximum allowable
emissions, a company that has reduced its emissions, e.g., due to a plant closure or new
technology, could sell a permit to emit to someone else.  The new emission would be in place
of those that were not forthcoming due to the plant closure or new technology.  Thus, with
offset and emission permits, new emissions are allowed only if they are neutralized by either
an equal amount of carbon being sequestered somewhere else (an offset) or where the new
emission is a replacement for a reduced emission somewhere else (an emission permit).
Some Confusions
When speaking about the price of carbon offsets, there appears to be some confusion
as to the period covered by the offset.  Is the offset valid for one year after which time it must
be renewed?  Or, is an offset of a permanent or unlimited duration?  Most of the work
estimating the cost of sequestering carbon is dealing with permanent offsets (for example see
Sedjo et al., 1995).  This was also the case for the GEF/WB 1995 study of forestry carbon
costs in Argentina.  Thus, to do the task intended carbon offsets must be essentially
permanent.  However, there appear to be cases where offsets are available for short periods,
perhaps a year.  One might make the case that since carbon offsets are reversible, they ought
to be created for a limited time period, e.g., one year, and renewable only upon assurance that
the offset, e.g., the forest, is still in effect.Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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Future Prices and the Forestry Model Findings
The earlier section of this report detailed the findings of the simple joint product
forestry model.  To summarize, our analysis used alternative assumptions regarding future
prices of permanent carbon offsets.  At some sufficiently high future price, the benefits will
cover the timber production costs, assumed to have a present value of about $1000 per ha,
mostly associated with the plantation establishment.  However, at many possible future prices
the financial criteria will not be met.  In our analysis we examined the implications of an
assumed a price of $10 and $20 per tonne of carbon for a permanent offset.  At the $10 price
the discounted benefits (revenues) of the carbon and the timber were about equal, but none of
the plantation projects examined was economically justified.  All scenario projections had
benefits substantially less than costs at the 10 percent level.  At the $20 per tonne of carbon
price of a permanent carbon offset, however, the value of the carbon benefits double and the
total discounted present value of the benefits from carbon offset and timber receipts
approximately equal the cost.  This indicates that the project has an internal rate of return of
about 10 percent, the target level.
These results provide both promise and concern for countries like Argentina.  A well-
formed world market for carbon offsets has not yet been developed.  Hence, we have little
market information as to the likely near-term prices and even less regarding the long-run
market price of offsets.  However, a number of studies suggests prices ranging considerably
higher from twenty to sixty dollars per ton (Sedjo et al., 1995; Stavins, 1999).
Some real world experience is available at the Costa Rican Office of Joint
Implementation (OCIC) which is said to generally price carbon offsets at about $10 per tonne.
However, the period for which the offset is valid is somewhat unclear and appears to be
variable.  In some cases these appear to be for a single year, in other cases for several years up
to perhaps 20 years.  A price of $10 per tonne per year can be viewed as equivalent to a $100
value for a permanent offset (using a 10 percent discount rate).  Additionally, some types of
alternative energy technologies and carbon capturing technologies involve substantially
higher likely costs.  For example, solar collectors for hot water are estimated to cost $30 per
tonne and photovoltacics $185.7 per tonne of carbon abated.  If those prices are
representative, forest carbon offers a low-cost alternative that is likely to be utilized.  Demand
for carbon offsets could produce high, attractive payments for offsets.  Of course, in the
longer term technology may well find low-cost alternatives to fossil fuel energy or develop
means of "scrubbing" or "capturing" the carbon from fossil fuels.  Thus, there is a huge degree
of uncertainty about the long-term future value of carbon offsets and their likely future prices.
Many believe that prices are likely to rise in the longer term as concerns increase and
companies need to make required adjustments.  Thus, it may be sensible for an intermediating
institution to collect offsets today, when prices are low to be released in the market if and
when prices rise.  To some extent this service is being provided by the members of the Utility
Forest Carbon Management Program (UCMTP) in the US and by the OCIC in Costa Rica (see
below).Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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Some Existing Institutional Arrangements for Carbon Credits
Markets for carbon credits are not well developed, in part because the international
community has not fully agreed as to what needs to be done nor precisely what will be the
role of carbon offset credits.  However, the concept of carbon emission activities in one
country being used by other countries as credits is well recognized.
Institutions are being developed to allow these multi-country activities and
transactions to be made.  Joint Implementation, for example, allows one country to purchase
carbon credits by undertaking carbon-reducing activities in another country.  Also, the newly
developed Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), coming out of Kyoto, may allow the same
general types of multi-country activities, purchases and trades.
Buyers' Side
From the side of potential buyers of carbon offsets, the US provides some interesting
examples of arrangements that can be made.  The development of a serious carbon offset
program has been encouraged by the State of New York's power authority's requirement that
electric power facilities that want to receive a license to increase their power generation
capacity must demonstrate that they have provided for any increased carbon emissions
resulting from the expansion.  In an early case a major power company made arrangements
for tree planting activities in Guatemala, thereby demonstrating to the State of New York
authorities that the new carbon emissions would be offset.  Other power companies have met
these obligations in a similar way.
Also, in the US, the electrical power industry, through the Edison Electric Institute
(EEI), an association of private electrical power companies, has formed a Utility Carbon
Management Tree Program whereby the various member companies invest monies into a
UFCMP project fund.  In this case the buyer is working directly with the carbon producers.
Proposals for various tree-planting projects that will sequester carbon are solicited from
potential contractors.  The UFCMP then selects which proposals will be funded, with the
rights to the carbon offset credits going to UFCMP.  The carbon offsets are distributed, as
with a mutual fund, to the utilities in proportion to their investment levels.  Currently the
UFCMP is a prototype operation "experimenting" with different types of projects and
arrangements.  However, it has invested about $5 million in over 20 projects in several
different countries including Russia, Belize and Malaysia, as well as the US.  This is the type
of operation that could become a major investor worldwide, particularly if the US seriously
moves to control carbon emissions and places increasingly stringent constraints on emissions
by electrical utilities.
Producers' Side
While the buyers need to identify needs and potential sources of secure and acceptable
offsets, the producers of carbon offsets need to find ways to create and certify new offsets.
This needs to be done in a context where buyers have offsets that are recognized and honored,
probably via some creditable third-party certification.Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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Perhaps the most well developed system for collecting and marketing carbon offsets
from the producers' side today is that of Costa Rica.  The system is approximately as follows:
A joint governmental/NGO organization, FONAFIFO, has the responsibility for collecting
Certifiable Tradable Offsets (CTO) by undertaking projects, some may be Joint
Implementation projects, in Costa Rica.  These projects may be conservation, management or
reforestation.  (We might note that currently it is uncertain whether carbon credits will be
awarded for conservation or management under the newly concluded Kyoto Protocol.
Presently, Kyoto seems to provide no credits for forest protection, although Annex 1 countries
receive carbon debits for deforestation.)   For reforestation, farmers are paid for over 5 years
for the first 5 years of carbon sequestration, with over 90 percent of the monies coming in the
first 3 years, whereas most of the carbon is accumulated in years 4 and 5.  The actual
existence of successful carbon sequestration is certified by a third party.  For Costa Rica the
certifier is SGS UK Ltd., Forestry Services, a member of the Societe Generale Surveillance of
Switzerland.
FONAFIFO now has rights to this carbon for 20 years.  The marketing rights to the
carbon are transferred to the Costa Rican Office on Joint Implementation (OCIC) that has
responsibility for marketing those rights as CTOs.  Investments come into the system in two
ways.  First, one-third of the fuel tax collected in Costa Rica is directed to FONAFIFO to
provide them with funds to purchase carbon offsets from the farmers based on their forestry
activities.  Second, investors may provide monies to OCIC for Joint Implementation projects.
Additionally, funds may be received by the sale of CTOs in the market.
It will be noted that there are two "subsidies" provided to the farmer in this system.
First, the fuel tax revenues that are directed to FONAFIFO are a subsidy to its operation find
their way to the farmer to promote his forestry activities.  Second, the farmer is paid most of
the monies before the carbon is actually accumulated.  This can be viewed as an interest free
(subsidized) loan by FONAFIFO to the farmer.
In Costa Rica, there is involvement by the central government, NGOs and quasi-
governmental groups as well as by the international community.  Additionally, they are
utilizing international mechanisms that exist; e.g., Joint Implementation, and they are
providing creditable third-party certification.
The model of Costa Rica is described, not because we believe that it should
necessarily be adopted by other countries, but rather because it provides an idea of what types
of arrangements can be made and perhaps some of the questions that need to be addressed,
e.g., timing of payments, appropriate role of government.
Another producer side issue to mention is that of adequate compensation.  At least two
of the UFCMP projects have had difficulties getting participation due to concerns about
whether the compensation was adequate.  One project in Oregon is having difficulty getting
landowners' cooperation to allow tree-plantings on their lands.  This is, in part, because the
compensation, which is three-fourths of the establishment costs, does not appear sufficient for
giving up the right to future carbon credits.  This suggests that producers may be quite
sensitive to the level of compensation and restrictions.  It also suggests that owners mayRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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behave strategically--withholding commitments for the future if the current compensation is
modest.  This may provide an argument that the carbon compensation should vary with future
prices thereby eliminating any incentives for landowners to wait for more favorable prices.
Institutional Arrangements for a Country Like Argentina: Some Thoughts
There are a number of likely participants in any future carbon sequestering and
marketing system in a country like Argentina.  These are private owners with lands suitable
for plantations, provincial governments, and the central government.  In addition, foreign
investors, offset buyers and independent certifiers also need to be considered.  In the
following section we will suggest some possible arrangements.
The lead on such an arrangement, in principle, could be taken by a variety of groups.
Obviously, the central, or perhaps the provincial governments could take the lead in such
activities.  Costa Rica is an example of where the central government took the lead but with
large involvement by other groups, private, NGO and foreign.  By contrast, the UFCMP is
strictly a private sector initiative, and working with a host of largely, but not entirely, private
landowners.  Both of these groups have the possibility of working through a formal JI group,
but they can also work outside of that formal structure.
One possibility, for example, is that the private sector takes the lead and establishes an
organization to promote investments in forest carbon in Patagonia or similar regions in other
countries.  However, as our forest model analysis shows, without some types of subsidies it
will be difficult to attract owners to forestry unless they expect carbon offsets to sell for $20
per permanent tonne.  Thus, the financial risk to the private landowner or private sector
promoters of forest carbon could be large and thus discourage serious investments in carbon
offsets unless and until high prices are actually experienced in the market.
1.   A Carbon Offset Collection Program
One role for an organization would be to collect carbon offset credits in the next few
years with the view to selling them in the long-term future.  This might be a role that
government could play in Argentina.  The government is already subsidizing plantations in
Patagonia.  In fact, the provincial government of Neuquen has a major additional subsidy
program and could easily become involved in a offset collection program.  The government
could create a formal carbon offset program whereby they receive rights to the offsets that are
being created through the subsidy program.  By creating a formal program today they avoid
any future argument that the credit should not count since they were generated without
thought of carbon.  The government might, for example, hold some portion of the rights for
themselves, to pay back the subsidies, and some portion in trust for the producer, who would
receive some fraction of the organization's proceeds when the offset were sold.  Thus, with
the subsidy the government would be purchasing the offset rights.  The extra effort involved
would include record keeping of the number and ownership of the various offsets, findingRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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some reputable certifier, and eventually developing some interactions with potential markets
and some marketing expertise.
2.   Risk Sharing:  A Role for Government
The financial realities suggest that some type of risks. especially early in the program,
are likely to be substantial..  There, some type of risk sharing may be desirable.  Although the
potential may be great, the risk of establishing plantations in the expectation of receiving large
payments for carbon offsets also appears potentially great.  Furthermore, the vast majority of
investment, establishment costs, must be borne early, and with most of the returns delayed
many years.  Even carbon benefits tend to occur mostly after two decades of growth due to
the slow initial growth of the species likely to do well in the region.  Thus, it appears unlikely
that the activities would get underway without some stronger expectation of the assurance of
significant future carbon revenues or some form of government start-up support.
In recent years, most of the plantations established in Patagonia received substantial
subsidies--in the range of 50 percent of the establishment costs--provided by the central
government.  It may be that a subsidy approach might have further justification in the guise of
an "infant industry" type of argument for the region.  In this way the central government
would also assume some of the risk associated with carbon forest plantations in Patagonia.
However, it has been observed that current subsidies provide only modest incentives to forest
establishment in Patagonia as establishment levels are modest.  The second part of the long-
term incentives would need to come from the carbon receipts for carbon offsets.  Our forest
model scenario shows that at a price of $10 per permanent tonne, forestry still is not
financially profitable with a 10 percent target return rate.  However, with an establishment
subsidy of about $500, the 10 percent target can be realized.
In the near term the government might expect to continue a subsidy program at about
the present level.  However, the government could agree to request repayment of the subsidies
from payments the farmers received of carbon offsets.  For example, 50 percent of the offset
payments might go to the government until the subsidies are repaid.  If offsets never come,
the subsidies are a grant.  If offset payments are small, the government might recapture a
portion of its subsidies to the farmers.  If offset payments are substantial, the government
could be reimbursed for its payments with farmers still receiving most of the offset payments.
(This could be done in the context of the "carbon offset collection program" discussed above.)
More generally, there could be a number of ways for the government to share the
revenues from offsets.  In addition to requiring payback of the establishment subsidies, these
can accrue to the government through tax revenues, some of which might apply only in the
case of very high carbon revenues.  Provincial governments, also, have the possibility to
collect some portion of any large "windfall" revenues through various tax measures.
One problem with waiting for the market to drive up the price of carbon offsets before
acting is the time lag between recognizing the existence of higher prices, actual planting and
the realization of significant carbon accumulations.  The government may assist in preparing
the way for a rapid response to the opportunity presented by a swiftly developing market forRoger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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carbon credits by creating supporting institutions that will already be in place if and when the
markets develop.  For example, the government might arrange to develop some excess
nursery capacity for desired species.  There appear to have been some difficulties, even in
recent years, in obtaining sufficient seedlings in Patagonia in a timely manner.  Should an
active well-priced market develop in offsets, it is almost certain the seedling availability
would quickly become a bottleneck.  The government need not establish its own nurseries, it
might simply provide subsidies for local nurseries with local capacity to provide the potential
to obtain high quality seedlings quickly, perhaps with an exclusive contract with a foreign
provider, even in difficult times.
Other improvements in tree planting capacity of this type may also be a useful way for
the central government to increase the capacity of the region to respond to opportunities.  Some
financing for these types of activities might be available through the development banks,
foreign aid or private foundations concerned about environmental and global warming issues.
3.   A Private Sector Model
A private model may be possible in Patagonia if the government is prepared to provide
some support and bear some of the more serious risks.  For example, the domestic power
companies might wish to participate in a program similar to that of the UCMFP in the US, or,
forest products companies might wish to enter the carbon credits business.  Although this
activity appears to be quite suited to forest companies, there appears to be some resentment to
the idea from environmental groups who don't seem to want the industry to benefit from
doing what environmentalist see them as doing already for financial gain.  This general view
seems to be reflected in the notion that small owners ought to be eligible for subsidies of
plantations that grow carbon, but large firms ought not be eligible for the same subsidy, even
if they too sequester carbon.  In any event, the private groups that appear most interested in
becoming involved in this activity are groups like the electrical power industry that have an
industry interest in directly using the offsets.
Another possibility could be for a foreign external group, like the UFCMP, to choose
to focus its attention on a region like Patagonia with the view to utilizing most of the carbon
offsets directly by members of the group, like the US utilities.  However, to have such a large
involvement in one region could be seen as risky for the foreign group.  Also, it would have to
view the government as reliable and not likely to add additional requirements, such as export
taxes for offsets, on the foreign group after it has become committed.  It appears more
reasonable that a local entity take the lead and work with foreign groups, recognizing that
they are likely to want a host of potential offset suppliers.
A local entity might get the support, both technical and perhaps financial, of a major
environmental NGO.  Thus, local involvement could be mixed with foreign expertise.  Again,
in the Patagonia case, it is difficult to see this effort being successful without the support of
the central government, at least initially if carbon offset prices are at modest levels.Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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Conclusions
Regions like Patagonia have the potential to sequester large amounts of the
atmosphere's carbon through the establishment of large areas of plantation forests.  However,
for such a venture to be self-financing over the long term a number of conditions need to be
met.  First, there needs to be a means for converting the sequestered carbon into carbon
offsets that are recognized and valued in the marketplace.  Second, the market price for the
offsets needs to be expected to exceed some threshold level, at least $20 per tonne in the case
of Patagonia for permanent carbon offsets.  To accomplish this it is almost certain that some
reliable means of certification would be required as well as some type of "clearinghouse" to
allow carbon offset buyers to interact with producers through offset sellers.
In concept, there are a variety of ways in which carbon offsets might be converted into
money.  In practice, the world is still experimenting with alternative possible institutional
arrangements.  Although we know how to grow trees, we know much less about
simultaneously providing incentives for tree growers through creating a carbon offset vehicle
that will be attractive globally.  Countries, such as Argentina, should attempt to work with a
variety of sources that may provide financing and expertise.  This can run the spectrum from
environmental groups to foundations interested in environmental issues to electrical power
utility groups trying to insure that they will be able to obtain offsets in the future at a
reasonable cost.Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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APPENDIX:  SPREAD SHEETS













(m3) (m3) $ DPVbio DPVfin biological financial
0 1.4 0.26 $10 0.1 $15 $15
1 1.4 0.364 $4 0 0
2 2.8 0.728 3.64 0 0
3 4.2 1.092 3.64 0 0
5 7 1.82 7.28 0 0
7 9.8 2.548 7.28 0 0
9 12.6 3.276 7.28 0 0
10 14 3.64 3.64 0 0
11.7 16.38 4.2588 6.188 0 0
18 25.2 6.552 22.932 0 0
25 35 9.1 25.48 0 0
33.6 47.04 12.2304 31.304 0 0
47 65.8 17.108 48.776 0 0
61 85.4 22.204 50.96 0 0
75 105 27.3 50.96 0 0
109 152.6 39.676 123.76 0 0
130 182 47.32 76.44 0 0
149.4 209.16 54.3816 70.616 0 0
190 266 69.16 147.784 0 0
230 322 83.72 145.6 0 0
247.8 346.92 90.1992 64.792 0 0
290 406 105.56 153.608 0 0
330 462 120.12 145.6 0 0
364.8 510.72 132.7872 126.672 0 0
390 546 141.96 91.728 0 0
430 602 156.52 145.6 0 0
461.7 646.38 168.0588 115.388 0 $6,925.5
480 672 174.72 66.612 0 0
510 714 185.64 109.2 0 0
540 756 196.56 109.2 0 0
560 784 203.84 72.8 0 0
580 812 211.12 72.8 0 0
600.6 840.84 218.6184 74.984 0 0
620 868 225.68 70.616 0 0
640 896 232.96 72.8 0 0
662.4 927.36 241.1136 81.536 $9,936 0
DPV $346.97 $307.13 $353.56 $581.09Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
18













(m3) (m3) $ DPVbio DPVfin biol fina thinng
0 1.4 0.26 $10 0.1 $15 $15 $13
1 1.4 0.364 $4 0 0 0
2 2.8 0.728 3.64 0 0 0
3 4.2 1.092 3.64 0 0 0
5 7 1.82 7.28 0 0 0
7 9.8 2.548 7.28 0 0 0
9 12.6 3.276 7.28 0 0 0
10 14 3.64 3.64 0 0 0
11.7 16.38 4.2588 6.188 0 0 0
18 25.2 6.552 22.932 0 0 0
25 35 9.1 25.48 0 0 0
33.6 47.04 12.2304 31.304 0 0 0
47 65.8 17.108 48.776 0 0 0
61 85.4 22.204 50.96 0 0 0
75 105 27.3 50.96 0 0 0
109 152.6 39.676 123.76 0 0 0
130 182 47.32 76.44 0 0 0
100 140 36.4 -109.2 0 0 50
190 266 69.16 327.6 0 0 0
230 322 83.72 145.6 0 0 0
247.8 346.92 90.1992 64.792 0 0 0
290 406 105.56 153.608 0 0 0
330 462 120.12 145.6 0 0 0
364.8 510.72 132.7872 126.672 0 0 0
390 546 141.96 91.728 0 0 0
430 602 156.52 145.6 0 0 0
461.7 646.38 168.0588 115.388 0 $6,925.5 0
480 672 174.72 66.612 0 0 0
360 504 131.04 -436.8 0 0 150
540 756 196.56 655.2 0 0 0
560 784 203.84 72.8 0 0 0
580 812 211.12 72.8 0 0 0
600.6 840.84 218.6184 74.984 0 0 0
620 868 225.68 70.616 0 0 0
640 896 232.96 72.8 0 0 0
662.4 927.36 241.1136 81.536 $9,936 0 0
DPV $340.30 $303.89 $353.56 $581.09 $20.29Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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(m3) (m3) $ DPVbio DPVfin biolog financ
0 1.4 0.26 $10 0.1 $15 $15
1 1.4 0.364 $4 0 0
2 2.8 0.728 3.64 0 0
3 4.2 1.092 3.64 0 0
5 7 1.82 7.28 0 0
7 9.8 2.548 7.28 0 0
9 12.6 3.276 7.28 0 0
10 14 3.64 3.64 0 0
11.7 16.38 4.2588 6.188 0 0
18 25.2 6.552 22.932 0 0
25 35 9.1 25.48 0 0
33.6 47.04 12.2304 31.304 0 0
47 65.8 17.108 48.776 0 0
61 85.4 22.204 50.96 0 0
75 105 27.3 50.96 0 0
109 152.6 39.676 123.76 0 0
130 182 47.32 76.44 0 0
149.4 209.16 54.3816 70.616 0 0
190 266 69.16 147.784 0 0
230 322 83.72 145.6 0 0
247.8 346.92 90.1992 64.792 0 0
290 406 105.56 153.608 0 0
330 462 120.12 145.6 0 0
364.8 510.72 132.7872 126.672 0 0
390 546 141.96 91.728 0 0
430 602 156.52 145.6 0 0
461.7 646.38 168.0588 115.388 0 $6,925.5
480 672 174.72 66.612 0 0
510 714 185.64 109.2 0 0
540 756 196.56 109.2 0 0
560 784 203.84 72.8 0 0
580 812 211.12 72.8 0 0
600.6 840.84 218.6184 74.984 0 0
620 868 225.68 70.616 0 0
640 896 232.96 72.8 0 0
662.4 927.36 241.1136 81.536 $9,936 0
DPV $346.97 $307.13 $353.56 $581.09Roger A. Sedjo RFF 99-27
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